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Abstract 
In this paper, I consider a specific channel through which trust between parties to an exchange can go on 
to affect nations’ comparative advantage in certain industries. My approach revolves around the 
autonomy that employers (principals) grant to workers (agents), which is a key feature of workplace 
organization. I hypothesize that social trust generates a comparative advantage in industries with more 
autonomous micro production environments. I employ individual-level data on work autonomy to 
construct a measure of the extent to which industries are characterized by autonomy in the production 
process. Results of a cross-country cross-industry analysis confirm that countries with higher levels of 
social trust have a comparative advantage in high-autonomy industries and vice versa. Results are robust 
to the possibility of reverse causality. The paper’s key contribution is to provide a link between the 
microeconomic literature on workplace organization and the comparative macroeconomic literature on 
social trust. 
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1. Introduction 
Social trust, which can be defined simply as a societal norm of cooperation, provides the basis for 
collective action and is linked to uncertainty reduction and lower transaction costs in economic exchange 
(Arrow, 1972; Gambetta, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995). As an informal enforcement mechanism, social trust 
allows exchange relationships to exist and extend beyond kinship-based communities, in turn sustaining a 
more fine-grained division of labour and increased specialization (Fukuyama, 1995). The macro-level 
implications of social trust—promoting economic prosperity and fostering other beneficial societal 
outcomes—are thus well understood (Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Algan and Cahuc, 2010). Moreover, the 
basic logic underlying these positive effects of social trust—running through enforcement, transaction 
costs, and the division of labour—is also clear. 
However, extant research has narrowly focused on relationships between macro-level variables and 
does not consider how exactly trust between two or more parties to an exchange goes on to affect 
economies in the aggregate. Whilst lower transaction costs and uncertainty reduction are intuitively 
appealing promoters of economic exchange at the micro level, little attention has been paid to the 
connection between the micro level at which social trust operates and trust’s effect on economic outcomes 
at the macro level. This paper seeks to contribute to the comparative macroeconomic literature on social 
trust by considering such a connection. Specifically, this paper works on developing and testing a micro-
level channel through which social trust affects nations’ comparative advantage. To do so, I combine two 
important developing research areas, one at the micro level and one at the macro level. 
First, a growing literature considers workplace organization or organizational design to account for 
firm-level differences in performance and productivity (see Bloom et al., 2014 for a review). I expand on 
earlier work to consider work autonomy instead of more narrow and concrete human resource 
management practices.1 Second, researchers have started to use cross-country cross-industry analysis to 
                                                           
1
 My focus on work autonomy matches most closely with Bloom et al.’s (2012) firm-level analysis 
relating trust to decentralization in multinational firms. More generally, several studies show that social 
 
 3 
 
study domestic institutions as determinants of comparative advantage, especially of industry export flows 
(see Nunn and Trefler, 2013 and Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2016 for reviews). The idea in this literature 
is that the institutions in a country can be an endowment in much the same way that traditional production 
factors such as labour and capital are. In particular, the relative strength or weakness of certain institutions 
in a country would lead this country to have a comparative advantage in certain types of activities or 
industries. Earlier cross-country cross-industry studies of countries’ comparative advantage focused on 
the role of formal institutions. Manova (2008, 2013), for instance, finds that countries with a well-
developed financial system have a comparative advantage in capital-intensive industries. I follow-up with 
a cross-country cross-industry analysis that considers social trust as a key informal institutional 
endowment.2 
Following the standard approach in the literature (Romalis, 2004; Nunn and Trefler, 2013), an 
essential feature of my cross-country cross-industry analysis is the benchmarking of industries. Whereas 
capital or labour intensity are standard industry benchmarks, my concern with social trust and workplace 
organization means that I characterize the organization of work in a particular industry based on the level 
of autonomy granted to employees in this industry. Trust operates at the micro level where it governs 
interactions between economic actors. Hence, by considering the level of work autonomy that principals 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
trust has a positive effect on the level of autonomy granted to employees (Van Hoorn, 2013; Gur and 
Bjørnskov, 2016). Figure A.1 in the appendix documents this positive correlation between social trust and 
average work autonomy in a country, using data from two of the main datasets used in this paper. 
2
 Tabellini (2008) and Cingano and Pinotti (2012) examine the effect of social trust on export flows from 
different types of industries. Compared to my work, these studies suffer several drawbacks, however. 
These drawbacks include biased results on the count of so-called attenuation and amplification effects 
(Nunn and Trefler, 2013; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2016) and the use of blunt instrumental variables 
(Bazzi and Clemens, 2013) that violate the exclusion restriction (see, also, for example Algan and Cahuc, 
2013 for a discussion of violations of the exclusion restriction in social trust studies). 
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grant to their agents, I am able to construct an industry measure that embodies micro-level evidence on a 
vital form of exchange between two parties. Many papers in the literature on domestic institutions and 
export patterns construct industry benchmarks based on industries’ intermediate inputs such as capital. 
The present paper, in contrast, employs individual-level data, thus obtaining an industry benchmark that 
gives a most detailed and direct reflection of what goes on in firms within specific industries and how 
people in an industry work together to create added value. Empirically, the key question that I address in 
this paper is how social trust interacts with my industry benchmark and affects whether countries have a 
comparative advantage in high- or low-autonomy industries. 
Workplace organization, specifically work autonomy, provides the starting point for my analysis. A 
straightforward definition of work autonomy is as ‘the condition or quality of being self-governing or free 
from excessive external control’ (Jermier and Michaels, 2001: 1006). I have the following hypothesis: the 
stronger a country’s social trust norm, the more this country has a comparative advantage in industries 
characterized by high levels of work autonomy in their production processes. Autonomy for workers is 
associated with various advantages for firms, deriving from the division of labour and specialization in 
the production process (Becker and Murphy, 1992). Granting specialist workers the autonomy to organize 
their productive activities in the way they deem fit results in a more efficient production process than 
when a non-specialist manager tells workers exactly what they should be doing. However, a disadvantage 
of giving employees freedom to perform their job in their own way is that, in the absence of monitoring 
and control, it can be difficult to get employees to act in the best interest of the firm, as highlighted by the 
classic principal-agent problem. In short, for firms, work autonomy only pays off if this autonomy is 
accompanied by a certain amount of trust. The reason is that the presence of trust implies that the 
principal is justified in relying on the agent to foster the principal’s interests despite a lack of formal 
incentives. In contrast, if trust is absent, costs due to shirking are likely to outweigh the benefits of having 
expert workers that can leverage tacit skills and uncodified knowledge. The effect of social trust that 
matters here is therefore not so much about beliefs that employers have about their workers, but about 
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how workers will behave when granted a certain amount of autonomy. Aggregating the above logic of 
trust as a form of cooperation, I expect that industries characterized by highly autonomous work 
environments will flourish in high-trust societies, whilst these industries will struggle in low-trust 
societies. More specifically, I expect that social trust acts as an institutional endowment so that countries 
with strong societal trust norms will have a comparative advantage in industries with more autonomous 
work environments as for these industries social trust is a relatively more important endowment. Overall, 
the theoretical rationale for my hypothesis thus follows the standard logic of comparative advantage and 
relative factor abundance: countries will have a comparative advantage in those industries for which their 
informal institutional endowments provide a useful resource for firms active in these industries and vice 
versa.3 
To test my hypothesis, I use the standard cross-country cross-industry estimating equation for 
comparative advantage (e.g., Romalis, 2004). This means that I interact my measure of social trust with 
the industry benchmark of work autonomy, whilst controlling for country and industry fixed effects. A 
positive and significant coefficient for this interaction indicates that countries with higher social trust have 
a comparative advantage in high-autonomy industries, which would confirm my hypothesis. Results 
provide strong support for my hypothesis and are robust to a variety of checks, including the use of 
alternative measures of industry work autonomy. To identify whether social trust indeed causally interacts 
with industry work autonomy to affect countries’ comparative advantage in specific industries, I build on 
Algan and Cahuc’s (2010) analysis and use trust scores from migrants to measure the cultural component 
of social trust that is independent of countries’ economic and institutional environment. The resulting 
trust indicator helps affirm that social trust causally interacts with workplace organization to shape cross-
                                                           
3
 Of course, the proposition that high-trust countries have a comparative advantage in high-autonomy 
industries (and vice versa) takes in the empirical evidence showing a positive effect of social trust on 
work autonomy (e.g., Bloom et al., 2012; Van Hoorn, 2013; Gur and Bjørnskov, 2016; see, also, Note 1 
and Figure A.1 in the appendix). 
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country patterns of comparative advantage. Overall, the evidence thus provides strong empirical support 
for the idea that social trust interacts with workplace organization to affect economies in the aggregate. 
This paper, then, makes two main contributions, an empirical one and a broader, conceptual one. 
Extant studies of the economics of social trust leave us wondering about a specific channel through which 
trust between parties to an exchange affects economies in the aggregate. The basic logic—running 
through uncertainty reduction and lowering of transaction costs—is obvious, but lacks detailed evidence 
on the steps involved, particularly at the micro level, which is the level at which we expect trust to act as 
an informal enforcement mechanism that facilitates exchange between economic actors. My main 
empirical contribution subsequently is to pin down a specific channel for a key macroeconomic 
consequence of social trust, namely nations’ comparative advantage. Starting with workplace 
organization at the micro level and going up all the way to comparative advantage at the macro level, this 
paper’s empirical evidence shows how trust between two parties can go on to affect societies as whole. 
The paper’s broader contribution lies in connecting important research areas. Institutions, formal ones 
such as rule of law and informal ones such as culture and social trust, are widely recognized for having 
important macroeconomic consequences. Similarly, there is increasing interest in workplace organization 
and organizational design as key determinants of firm performance. Nevertheless, even though the 
development of economies as a whole is crucially driven by the activities of firms, these two literatures 
have mostly developed disjointedly. My paper indicates one way of integrating the two strands of 
research, forging the kind of connection between different levels of analysis that seems vital for better 
understanding a variety of macroeconomic outcomes and how these are affected by informal institutions. 
 
2. Autonomy as a feature of workplace organization 
2.1 Measuring work autonomy 
Management scholars have long been interested in features of workplace organization and what workers 
actually experience in their jobs (e.g., Hackman and Oldham, 1975). Adam Smith’s (1776) famous 
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description of a pin factory is thereby identified as the first contribution on this topic (Oldham and 
Hackman, 2010). The typical approach to measuring work autonomy (or other features of workplace 
organization) is via surveys, specifically questionnaire items that ask respondents to report on the level of 
autonomy or freedom that they experience in their work. Different survey instruments are available and 
the most widely used instruments simply ask respondents something along the following lines: ‘Using this 
card, please say how much the management at your work allows/allowed you to decide how your own 
daily work is organised.’ This item is included in the European Social Survey (ESS) (Jowell and the 
Central Co-ordinating Team, 2007), a cross-national survey of some 30 Eurasian countries, and actually 
the main item that I draw on in this paper. Respondents can rate their level of work autonomy from 0, ‘I 
have/had no influence’ to 10, ‘I have/had complete control.’ Of course, many different item wordings are 
possible. The US General Social Survey (GSS) (Smith et al., 2013), for instance, presents a statement to 
respondents (‘I am given a lot of freedom to decide how to do my own work’) and offers four possible 
answers (‘1 - Not at all true,’ ‘2 - Not too true,’ ‘3 - Somewhat true,’ and ‘4 - Very true’).4 The basic idea 
is always the same, however, namely that people report on their experienced level of work autonomy. 
 
2.2 Validity of measured work autonomy 
A concern with the typical work autonomy measure is that it is subjective, based on individuals’ 
perceptions, which could result in biases due to non-random measurement error. Of course, work 
autonomy has already been much studied in management (see Jermier and Michaels, 2001 for a review). 
Nevertheless, to gather some explicit evidence on the validity of measured work autonomy, I adopt the 
standard approach to assessing construct validity in psychology, which is to check how a measured 
construct relates to other constructs that would theoretically relate to the construct of interest in specific 
ways (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955). If a construct is valid, it should exhibit logical relationships with other 
                                                           
4
 For this last example, I have reverse coded the original answer categories of the item to let higher scores 
indicate higher levels of work autonomy. 
 8 
 
constructs. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Taking this approach, I find that measured work autonomy relates to a variety of other factors in a 
manner that provides strong validation of the construct (Table 1). Notably, managers have higher levels of 
work autonomy than subordinates do and the higher educated are granted more autonomy than people 
with lower levels of education are. In addition, levels of work autonomy relate to other perceived features 
of workplace organization, specifically the amount of influence people have on organizational decisions 
(see, also, Van Hoorn, 2016). Overall, patterns found are precisely the patterns that we expect from valid 
measures of work autonomy, strongly suggesting that indicators of work autonomy indeed measure what 
they are supposed to measure. 
 
3. A measure of industry work autonomy 
In this section, I construct a measure of industry work autonomy and demonstrate the reliability of this 
measure. Valid measures of work autonomy offer a great opportunity to benchmark industries on the basis 
of micro-level features of their work environments, in turn allowing me to establish a micro-level channel 
for the effect of social trust on macroeconomic outcomes. 
My approach is to employ individual-level data on work autonomy and construct an industry 
benchmark that captures how people in specific industries work together to create value added. By nature 
of their production processes and how these are organized, industries may be characterized as having 
more or less autonomous work environments. Taking this micro-level approach, I ensure that my analysis 
of countries’ comparative advantage in specific industries is consistent with and, in fact, strongly 
grounded in our understanding of trust as a factor shaping exchange relationships between economic 
actors. 
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I measure industry work autonomy using the first four waves of the cross-national ESS data set 
introduced in the previous section. The first four waves of the ESS have recorded respondents’ industry of 
occupation using two-digit NACE codes (revision 1.1), for a total of 138,445 individual observations in 
62 industries.5 An important feature of my industry work autonomy measure is that it comprises 
individual-level data from multiple countries and not just one country, as is typical in the literature. A 
problem for cross-country cross-industry studies is so-called benchmarking bias, which can shift 
estimates downwards or upwards (Nunn and Trefler, 2013; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2016). A 
downward, attenuating bias occurs because the benchmarking of industries is subject to random 
measurement error. The upward, amplifying bias occurs because the benchmarking of industries on the 
basis of data from only one country (for example the US) likely results in an industry benchmark that is 
reminiscent of the specific institutions in this country that affect the country’s industrial structure. An 
upward bias then occurs because the resulting industry benchmark is more accurate for countries that are 
institutionally more similar to the country that provided the data used for constructing the original 
industry benchmark. I calculate the measure of industry work autonomy using data from 30 highly 
institutionally diverse countries, which likely alleviates the problem of benchmarking bias.6 Nevertheless, 
as a robustness check, I repeat my baseline analysis using two alternatives to my main measure of 
industry work autonomy. For the first alternative measure, I use only individual-level data from countries 
                                                           
5
 NACE codes refer to the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities developed by the statistical 
agency of the European Union. NACE codes match ISIC codes. I use data from the first four waves of the 
ESS only because the industry data from later waves of the ESS are not compatible with industry data 
from these earlier waves. 
6
 In terms of institutional diversity, these countries cover all five legal origins recognized in the literature 
(common law, French law, German law, socialist law, and Scandinavian law) and seven out of the 12 
clusters of national culture identified by Hofstede (2001), the world’s leading cross-cultural researcher 
(see Van Hoorn, 2016). 
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that have mean levels of work autonomy below the average of the 30 countries in the ESS sample. For the 
second alternative measure, I use only individual-level data from countries that have mean levels of work 
autonomy above the average of the 30 countries in the ESS sample. Dividing the individual-level work 
autonomy data this way ensures that I have two samples comprising roughly the same number of 
individuals when calculating the alternative measures of industry work autonomy. At the end of this 
section, I also check the reliability of my industry work autonomy measure, which relates to the issue of 
random measurement error in industry benchmarks. Meanwhile, the two alternative measures of industry 
work autonomy correlate strongly with my main measure of industry work autonomy (r = .907 for the 
‘below-average’ measure and r = .895 for the ‘above-average’ measure [n=21]). 
I calculate industry work autonomy as the mean level of work autonomy reported by all respondents 
working in a particular industry. Table 2 (Panel a) presents the results for the 24 industries for which I 
also have country data on comparative advantage (see the next section). Although the 24 industries are 
somewhat similar—none belong to the services sector—there is substantial variation in average work 
autonomy. Measured industry differences thereby have face validity with, for instance, the Manufacture 
of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks involving much more autonomy in the 
production process than the Manufacture of textiles does. Furthermore, measured differences between the 
24 industries coincide with our intuition concerning traditional sectors that have comparatively little 
potential for dynamic efficiency gains (e.g., Manufacture of tobacco products) and sectors that are more 
high-tech and have comparatively much potential for dynamic efficiency gains (e.g., Manufacture of 
office machinery and computers). I find similar industry differences for the alternative measures of 
industry work autonomy (Table B.1 in the appendix). 
To provide a comparative perspective, I also present aggregated autonomy scores for the second least 
autonomous industry, after the Manufacture of textiles (Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of peat), 
and for some high-autonomy industries that also cannot be considered in the empirical analysis due to 
missing data (Table 2, Panel b). 
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<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Although employing cross-national data alleviates (benchmarking) biases, a remaining question is 
whether the measure of industry work autonomy is reliable. A particular concern is whether enough 
workers per industry have responded to the questionnaire item on work autonomy to render consistent 
results for the measured differences in industries’ micro work environments. To check the reliability of 
the industry work autonomy measure, I triangulate measures of aggregate work autonomy across three 
different surveys (Table 3). These surveys have employed comparable but not identical questionnaire 
items to measure work autonomy. Moreover, data have been collected in a highly diverse group of 
countries, notably the US (GSS data), the Eurasian countries covered by the ESS data, and other countries 
from all over the world, including Japan, Mexico, Taiwan, South Africa and Dominican Republic (ISSP 
data). Notwithstanding, correlations between the various measures of aggregate work autonomy are 
strong, typically well above 0.70. 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
These high correlations between aggregated autonomy scores constructed from different questionnaire 
items and data collected in countries with highly diverse institutional environments indicate that measures 
of industry work autonomy are, in fact, highly reliable, and not nearly as susceptible to measurement error 
as one might expect. Whether we use data from Eurasian countries, the US, or a varied set of countries 
worldwide, the industry differences in aggregate work autonomy that we find are highly similar, 
independent of the sample or the precise measure of work autonomy used. Still, reliability (as evidenced 
by the correlations between the three measures) tends to improve from having more individual-level 
respondents on which to base the work autonomy score of an industry (see, for example, Panel a of Table 
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3 versus Panel b of Table 3). The most reliable results are obtained when there are at least 100 
respondents per industry (Panel c of Table 3). In the empirical analysis, I therefore only include industries 
that meet this observational threshold. As it turns out, all industries depicted in Panel a of Table 2 meet 
this threshold (the lowest number of individual-level observations for any industry is 107). 
 
4. Estimating equation and data 
4.1 Estimating equation 
I test the hypothesis that social trust interacts with industry work autonomy to affect countries’ 
comparative advantage by estimating the following standard equation (Romalis, 2004): 
 
citcici3ci2ci10ci εYUuHaβHsβTaββlnR +++++++= .  (1) 
 
In this equation, lnRci is the natural logarithm of the revealed comparative advantage of country c in 
industry i, ai is the measure of industry work autonomy, and Tc is a country’s social trust norm. The key 
term in this equation is the interaction between industry work autonomy and social trust (aiTc). By my 
hypothesis, a stronger social trust norm interacts with workplace organization to generate a comparative 
advantage in high-autonomy industries. Hence, I expect a positive coefficient for this trust interaction. 
A concern with the trust interaction is that both social trust (Tc) and industry work autonomy (ai) 
proxy for another set of industry features and country factors that also interact to affect nations’ 
comparative advantage in specific industries. Notably, social trust and industry work autonomy appear 
closely related to human capital, not least as firms seem more likely to grant autonomy to workers when 
these workers are better skilled and more highly educated (cf. Table 1). To make sure that we are, in fact, 
capturing the effect of social trust interacting with work autonomy to affect comparative advantage and 
not any effect due to human capital and skill intensity, Eq. 1 includes two more interaction terms. The 
first of these interaction terms involves the high skill intensity of industries and countries’ human capital 
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endowment (siHc). The second additional interaction term involves industry work autonomy and again 
countries’ human capital endowment (aiHc). Together, these two additional interaction terms help rule out 
any spurious effects that otherwise might be captured by the trust interaction but that, in reality, derive 
from a country’s human capital endowment or from an industry’s level of skill intensity. 
To complete the estimating equation, Eq. 1 further includes industry (ui) and country fixed effects 
(Uc), which is standard. Let me thereby emphasize that, following the standard of cross-country cross-
industry analysis, the estimating equation does not include ai and Tc separately. Instead, the estimating 
equation includes industry (ui) and country fixed effects (Uc), which capture possible direct effects of ai 
(which are not unique to countries) and of Tc (which are not unique to industries) as well as any other 
potential industry or country confounders (e.g., Nunn and Trefler, 2013; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 
2016). 
The model depicted in Eq. 1, meaning the model that includes the high skill intensity interaction and 
the human capital work autonomy interaction, is the baseline model of my empirical analysis. However, 
for my robustness checks, I also estimate models with other interaction terms added. Specifically, a 
possible concern is that the model in Eq. 1, whilst controlling for human capital and skill intensity, still 
suffers an omitted variable bias. First, not yet considered, countries’ formal institutional environment may 
also play a role (cf. Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). Hence, to rule out any spurious effect that might 
derive from not controlling for quality of formal institutions, I also consider a model that adds the 
interaction between institutional quality of country c (Qc) and industry work autonomy (ai) to the baseline 
model depicted in Eq. 1.7 Second, I want to rule out that any effect found might be due to higher social 
                                                           
7
 Still, it may be noted that, from a theoretical perspective, the interaction between formal institutional 
arrangements and industry work autonomy is likely to be less important than the interaction between trust 
and industry work autonomy. The reason is that the nature of the concept of work autonomy means that, 
almost by definition, it does not involve any formal contract or agreement between the principal and the 
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trust, somehow, favouring industries that are more dependent on external finance (cf. Manova, 2008, 
2013). Hence, I also extend Eq. 1 to consider the interaction between social trust (Tc) and an industry 
benchmark of reliance on external finance (fi). 
 
4.2 Data 
4.2.1 Dependent variable. My measure of comparative advantage is Balassa’s (1965) well-known index of 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA). This index defines the revealed comparative advantage of 
industry i in country c as: RCAic = (Xic / Xc) / (Xi / X), where Xic denotes exports of industry i in country 
c, Xc denotes total exports by country c across all industries, Xi denotes total exports of industry i in all 
other countries combined (specifically all other OECD countries), and X denotes total exports by all other 
countries combined. The underlying data are thereby converted to a common currency. Data come from 
the OECD Database for Structural Analysis (known as the STAN database) with conversion to a common 
currency using US$ GDP Purchasing Power Parities (OECD, 2010). As the RCA data in STAN cover the 
years 1999-2008, I am able to calculate industries’ average comparative advantage over multiple years, 
which reduces measurement error due to idiosyncratic shocks (for example fluctuations in oil prices 
affecting Norway’s revealed comparative advantage or disadvantage in certain industries). 
I am able to match industry autonomy scores to data on RCA for 24 industries from the STAN 
database (see Table 2). To be sure, the STAN database covers more industries. However, these are not at 
the two-digit NACE level, notably because they collapse RCA scores for two or more two-digit industries 
into one. For example, NACE industries 13 (Mining of metal ores) and 14 (Other mining) do not have 
distinct RCA scores in the STAN database only a single score covering both these industries. I therefore 
cannot match these RCA data with the industry work autonomy measure constructed in Section 3, as this 
measure concerns only distinct two-digit industries. Implication is that the analysis below does not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
agent that could be subject to enforcement through formal institutions. Consistent with this observation, 
Van Hoorn (2013) finds that trust is more strongly related to work autonomy than is institutional quality. 
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consider all industries in the countries in my sample. Note, though, that this lack of industry data does not 
affect the RCA measure itself, which is still constructed involving the exports of all countries in all 
industries. As data on Luxembourg are missing, the STAN database has data available for 29 countries, 
all OECD members. The empirical analyses thus concern a total of 24x29=696 observations. Table B.1 in 
the appendix presents descriptive statistics for the industries included in the analysis. Table B.2 lists the 
countries in the sample. 
 
4.2.2 Key independent variables. Eq. 1 has two key independent variables. The first is the measure of 
industry work autonomy described in the previous section. The second is social trust. I use the measure of 
trust available from the European Value Study (EVS) and World Values Survey (WVS) (European 
Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, 2006; World Values Survey Association, 
2009). This canonical measure derives from the dummy-coded questionnaire item asking respondents 
whether they find ‘most people can be trusted’ (score of 1) or ‘you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people’ (score of 0). The EVS-WVS has collected trust data in different waves, starting in 1981. I follow 
the standard procedure in the literature, which is to calculate country trust norms by aggregating 
responses from the various waves, meaning that for most countries I include responses from more than 
one wave. This procedure matches the conception of social trust as a stable cultural trait of societies with 
deep roots (Guiso et al., 2008). Table C.1 in the appendix presents scores on the trust measure for the 29 
countries in the sample. To address potential reverse causality, from comparative advantage to social 
trust, I also construct an alternative trust indicator that provides a more direct measure of the cultural 
component of social trust and is untainted by nations’ revealed comparative advantage. I describe the 
construction of this indicator and its rationale in detail in the next section. 
 
4.2.3 Other main independent variables. Eq. 1 contains two other important independent variables, one at 
the country level and one at the industry level. At the country level, I measure human capital endowment 
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using data on average years of schooling from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
statistical database (UNDP, 2014). This database provides a measure of countries’ average years of 
schooling, typically at five-year intervals. To match the period for calculating average RCA, I use data for 
the year 2005. 
At the industry level, I measure the intensity with which an industry uses high-skilled labour in the 
same way as I measure industry work autonomy. This means that I aggregate individual-level data from 
the ESS. I again draw on the first four waves of the ESS, and construct an individual-level dummy 
variable that gets a score of 1 if the respondent has had at least some tertiary education (ISCED 
classification V1 or higher; see Panel c of Table 1) and 0 otherwise. Aggregating this dummy variable at 
the industry level renders percentage scores denoting each industry’s level of high skill intensity. 
Percentage scores can range from 2.97% (Agriculture, hunting, related service activities) to 20.9% 
(Manufacture of office machinery and computers). Following the same procedure as just outlined, I also 
construct an alternative measures of industries’ skill intensity that refers to average years of education. I 
use this alternative measure to assess the robustness of my baseline results. Table B.1 presents details 
including the full set of industry scores. 
Finally, as indicated, my robustness checks also involve additional independent variables, specifically 
institutional quality at the country level and reliance on external finance at the industry level. To measure 
the quality of formal institutions in a country, I use the rule of law index from the World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators project (World Bank, 2015). As for human capital, I use data for the year 2005. To 
measure an industry’s reliance on external finance, I use data from the 2012/2013 round of the EBRD-
World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS V). This survey asks 
firms in a set of emerging economies whether they have a ‘line of credit or a loan from a financial 
institution?’ I subsequently calculate the industry benchmark by looking at the percentage of firms in a 
two-digit industry that responded yes to this question. 
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5. Empirical results 
5.1 Baseline results 
Table 4 presents the baseline results, obtained by estimating different specifications of Eq. 1. Results 
reveal a strong and statistically highly significantly positive interaction between social trust and 
workplace organization (Model 1), which confirms my hypothesis that societies with stronger trust norms 
have a comparative advantage in industries characterized by more autonomous work environments, and 
vice versa. This relationship between social trust, workplace organization, and industry comparative 
advantage remains when controlling for confounding effects associated with countries’ human capital 
endowment and the intensity with which industries use high-skilled labour in their production processes 
(Models 2-4). The coefficients for the interaction terms involving human capital both have the expected 
sign and are statistically significant at usual levels when included separately (Models 2-3). Including both 
interaction terms simultaneously, however, neither of the terms is statistically significant at usual levels, 
whilst the social trust interaction is (Model 4). 
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
More important than statistical significance, the social trust interaction is also highly significant in 
terms of effect size. As I report standardized beta coefficients, we can easily ascertain that a one standard 
deviation increase in the trust interaction is associated with an increase in revealed comparative advantage 
of about one standard deviation, ceteris paribus. Naturally, the magnitude of the coefficient for the trust 
interaction decreases a bit when adding control variables. This is as expected, however, given that social 
trust is recognized to have a positive effect on human capital accumulation (Coleman, 1988). In fact, there 
is a case to be made that Models 2-4 are overfitted because social trust has a causal effect on human 
capital. In terms of the aim of this paper, these baseline results provide strong support for the idea that 
industries characterized by highly autonomous micro work environments flourish in high-trust societies, 
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in turn resulting in predictable patterns of comparative advantage at the macro level. 
 
5.2 Robustness checks 
To assess the robustness of the baseline results presented in Table 4, I perform several additional checks. I 
start with a very simple and general check that explicitly deals with outliers. For this purpose, I re-
estimate Eq. 1 (Model 4 in Table 4) using quantile regressions and a sample that excludes any 
observations that score more than two standard deviations below or above the mean on either revealed 
comparative advantage (lnRci) or on the trust interaction (aiTc). To save space, I do not report detailed 
results here, but these are available on request. In all cases, the coefficient for the interaction between 
social trust and industry work autonomy remains strongly positive and highly statistically significant. 
As indicated in the previous section, to address potential benchmarking biases (Nunn and Trefler, 
2013; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2016), I check the robustness of my baseline results to the measure of 
industry work autonomy used. Results show that the relationship between the trust interaction and 
comparative advantage continues to hold when using the two alternative measures of industry work 
autonomy (Models 5 and 7 in Table 5). Estimates are less precise, but this is as expected given that the 
two alternative measures are based on less information (i.e., on fewer individual-level observations) than 
the original measure of industry work autonomy and, therefore, have more measurement error. In terms of 
attenuating or amplifying bias, using the two alternative measures of industry work autonomy renders 
both a larger and a smaller coefficient for the trust interaction compared to models that concern the same 
sample but employ my original measure of industry work autonomy (Model 5 versus Model 6 and Model 
7 versus Model 8). Being in between, I conclude that the original industry work autonomy measure is able 
to render estimates that are largely unbiased, neither over- nor understating the extent to which social trust 
and workplace organization interact to shape cross-country patterns of comparative advantage. 
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
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Expanding on the industry benchmarking check, I also assess whether the baseline results are robust 
to using the alternative measure of industry skill intensity that I have constructed. Again, results are 
largely the same as before (Model 9 in Table 5 versus Model 4 in Table 4). 
 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
Finally, I extend the baseline model to control for quality of formal institutions and industries’ 
dependence on external finance respectively (Table 6). In all cases, the estimated coefficient for the 
interaction between trust and industry work autonomy remains strongly and statistically significantly 
positive. This finding extends to the model that considers both institutional quality and dependence on 
external finance simultaneously (Model 13). 
 
5.3 Dealing with potential reverse causality 
Although the above results are suggestive of social trust causally interacting with workplace organization 
to affect industry comparative advantage, without additional evidence we cannot rule out completely that 
there is reverse causality between social trust and countries’ comparative advantage in certain industries. 
Indeed, the positive relationship between the trust interaction and revealed comparative advantage would 
also be consistent with a process in which countries that have a comparative advantage in high-autonomy 
industries tend to develop societal norms that provide further support to the workings of these industries. 
Ordinarily, one would deal with this endogeneity problem via instrumental variables analysis. 
Instrumenting for social trust is notoriously problematic, however, as the factor(s) that could instrument 
for social trust typically also instrument for other determinants of comparative advantage, thus violating 
the exclusion restriction (e.g., Algan and Cahuc, 2013),. 
My solution is to construct an indicator of social trust that captures the stable cultural component of 
 20 
 
trust, meaning that this indicator is as much as possible independent of economic and institutional 
influences in general and of industry comparative advantage in particular. The way I go about 
constructing this indicator is to use trust levels reported by migrants to proxy for social trust in these 
migrants’ countries of ancestry (cf. Algan and Cahuc, 2010). Migrants are a special group, as they can 
still harbour their culturally determined trust attitudes but are not affected by the reigning economic and 
institutional conditions in their ancestry countries, simply because they no longer reside in these 
countries. Accordingly, the remaining country-of-ancestry effects are a direct reflection of the cultural 
component of social trust, whilst the only economic or institutional influences on migrants’ trust levels 
are due to the economic and institutional conditions in their destination countries. The data that I use to 
construct this indicator of the cultural component of social trust come from the ESS (Waves 1-5) and 
concern first and second generation migrants. The appendix presents a detailed description of the 
construction of the indicator.8 
 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
I use the alternative social trust indicator to re-estimate the baseline model (Model 4). The trust 
interaction remains highly statistically significant and sizeable, also when I further control for institutional 
quality (cf. Model 10) (Table 7). Overall, I conclude that social trust indeed causally interacts with 
workplace organization to shape cross-country patterns of comparative advantage. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The idea of specialization through the division of labour is one of the most powerful ideas in economics. 
                                                           
8
 Compared to the US General Social Survey (GSS) data that Algan and Cahuc (2010) use, the ESS data 
are much richer, allowing me to construct this trust indicator for the largest share of countries in my 
sample (and, with an eye to future research, many more countries that are not in my sample). 
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Trust subsequently is widely recognized for its role as a social lubricant, fostering mutually beneficial 
exchange and thereby sustaining higher levels of specialization. Moreover, many studies show that social 
trust is a robust determinant of various macroeconomic outcomes. What is lacking, however, is a specific 
pathway that can take us from the micro logic of trust as a promoter of economic exchange to the macro 
evidence on the effect of social trust on societies as a whole. In this paper, I have sought to develop such a 
channel, working on pinning down how social trust may matter for the interaction between economic 
actors at the micro level in a way that affects economies in the aggregate. Specifically, my empirical 
analysis indicates that social trust interacts with workplace organization to determine countries’ 
comparative advantage and shape cross-country patterns of comparative advantage. 
The paper’s broader contribution lies in bringing together two important literatures that so far have 
been largely unconnected. Significant advances have been made in the literature on the effect of 
workplace organization and organizational design on firm performance (e.g., Bloom et al., 2014) and in 
the literature on the effect of informal institutions, particularly social trust, on macroeconomic outcomes 
(Algan and Cahuc, 2013). Unfortunately, these developments have been happening largely independent 
from each other. From this perspective, the connection that I have sought to develop in this paper can be 
seen to act as a lynchpin that brings the two literatures together. A most fruitful avenue for future research 
is to establish further lynchpins as a way of incorporating other types of microeconomic insights in the 
comparative study of economies. 
Future research could also address some of the limitations of the paper’s empirical analysis. Most 
importantly, data availability has kept me from analysing a global sample of countries, analysing a sample 
of OECD countries instead. The narrow nature of this sample, covering only countries in relatively 
advanced stages of economic and institutional maturity, has likely biased my estimates against finding 
evidence that social trust interacts with workplace organization to affect the comparative advantage of 
nations. Nevertheless, we need follow-up research both to generalize the idea of linking microeconomic 
insights to the macroeconomic consequences of (in)formal institutions and to generalize my empirical 
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evidence to globally representative samples. 
 
 
Supplementary material 
The appendix for this paper is available online at the OUP website. All data used are publicly available. 
Data files and the SPSS syntax and Stata Do files that allow the regression results of this paper to be 
reproduced from these data sources are also available on the OUP website. 
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Table 1. Validity of the work autonomy measure 
Panel (a): General Social Survey (GSS) data 
 
Variable 
Mean work autonomy (1-
4) 
Manager  
Yes [n=418] 3.53    (0.736) 
No [n=743] 3.31    (0.856) 
Highest educational degree  
Less than high school [n=405] 3.35    (0.859) 
High school [n=2346] 3.33    (0.864) 
Associate/Junior college [n=442] 3.43    (0.789) 
Bachelor’s [n=933] 3.44    (0.751) 
Graduate [n=512] 3.61    (0.641) 
In your job, how often do you take part with others in making decisions that 
affect you? 
 
Often [n=1907] 3.58    (0.658) 
Sometimes [n=1663] 3.35    (0.794) 
Rarely [n=669] 3.14    (0.950) 
Never [n=396] 3.09    (1.08) 
How often do you participate with others in helping set the way things are 
done on your job? 
 
Often [n=1554] 3.58    (0.685) 
Sometimes [n=1181] 3.34    (0.784) 
Rarely [n=461] 3.12    (0.909) 
Never [n=277] 3.00    (1.11) 
Panel (b): International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data 
 
Variable 
Mean work autonomy (1-
3) 
Manager  
Yes [n=7461] 2.20    (0.679) 
No [n=15,652] 1.88    (0.742) 
Education level  
No formal qualification [n=2268] 1.84    (0.820) 
Lowest formal qualification [n=2763] 1.95    (0.807) 
Above lowest qualification [n=4284] 1.96    (0.753) 
Higher secondary completed [n=5315] 1.97    (0.729) 
Above higher secondary level [n=4743] 2.05    (0.705) 
University degree completed [n=4879] 2.15    (0.672) 
Applies to respondent’s job: I can work independently  
Strongly agree [n=6302] 2.33    (0.694) 
Agree [n=11,088] 2.08    (0.697) 
Neither agree nor disagree [n=2937] 1.71    (0.657) 
Disagree [n=2854] 1.53    (0.666) 
Strongly disagree [n=1080] 1.46    (0.657) 
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Table 1, continued. 
Panel (c): European Social Survey (ESS) data 
 
Variable 
Mean work autonomy (0-
10) 
Manager  
Yes [n=42,319] 7.72    (2.58) 
No [n=101,836] 5.18    (3.64) 
Education (ES-ISCED)  
I, less than lower secondary [n=6849] 4.50    (3.88) 
II, lower secondary [n=14,226] 4.65    (3.80) 
IIIb, upper secondary, vocational or no access to V1 [n=22,478] 5.33    (3.65) 
IIIa, upper secondary, general and/or access to V1 [n=17,599] 5.77    (3.48) 
IV, advanced vocational, sub-degree [n=8496] 6.52    (3.31) 
V1, lower tertiary education, BA level [n=9106] 7.34    (2.68) 
V2, higher tertiary education, >= MA level [n=9325] 7.42    (2.69) 
Current job: can decide time start/finish work  
Not at all true [n=9692] 4.96    (3.50) 
A little true [n=3690] 6.33    (2.93) 
Quite true [n=2852] 7.41    (2.50) 
Very true [n=2395] 8.20    (2.45) 
Years of schooling (seven quantiles)  
Quantile 1 (4.82 years of schooling on average) [n=14,161] 4.88    (3.87) 
Quantile 2 (8.51 years of schooling on average) [n=17,334] 4.94    (3.81) 
Quantile 3 (10.6 years of schooling on average) [n=25,500] 5.31    (3.69) 
Quantile 4 (12.0 years of schooling on average) [n=22,967] 5.66    (3.56) 
Quantile 5 (13.0 years of schooling on average) [n=13,780] 6.06    (3.39) 
Quantile 6 (14.9 years of schooling on average) [n=29,562] 6.73    (3.14) 
Quantile 7 (18.7 years of schooling on average) [n=20,411] 7.36    (2.73) 
Allowed to influence policy decisions about activities of organization (0-10)  
0 I have/had no influence [n=38,206] 3.15    (3.65) 
1 [n=10,697] 4.18    (3.16) 
2 [n=8947] 5.28    (2.82) 
3 [n=7264] 5.86    (2.55) 
4 [n=5490] 6.15    (2.35) 
5 [n=11,206] 6.74    (2.26) 
6 [n=6869] 7.31    (1.86) 
7 [n=8417] 7.83    (1.70) 
8 [n=8695] 8.36    (1.51) 
9 [n=4740] 8.88    (1.34) 
10 I have/had complete control [n=14,539] 9.80    (0.993) 
Notes: Number of observations in square brackets and standard deviations in parentheses, if applicable. 
Data come from the GSS (years 2002, 2006, and 2010), the 2005 International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP) Module on Work Orientation (ISSP Research Group, 2013), and the ESS (Waves 1-4) (Jowell and 
the Central Co-ordinating Team, 2007). The ISSP measure of work autonomy asks respondents “Which 
of the following statements best describes how your daily work is organized?,” giving three possible 
answers: “1 - I am not free to decide how my daily work is organized,” “2 - I can decide how my daily 
work is organized, within certain limits,” and “3 - I am free to decide how my daily work is organized.” 
As with the GSS item, I have reverse coded answer categories for this item so that a higher score indicates 
more work independence. ISCED stands for International Standard Classification of Education. The 
division of respondents’ number of years of schooling in seven quantiles (ESS data) has been chosen to 
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match the seven categories of ISCED. Waves from the ESS are selected to match the ESS waves that I 
use later on to benchmark industries by their level of work autonomy. Instead of calculating mean 
autonomy scores, I have also estimated regression models with work autonomy as the dependent variable 
and the individual characteristics listed in the table as independent variables, as in Van Hoorn (2013). 
Results (available on request) reveal the same patterns as presented here, supporting the construct validity 
of the work autonomy measure. More information about the surveys used, as well as details on all 
questionnaire items, can be found at the websites of these surveys: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org 
for the ESS, http://gss.norc.org for the GSS, and http://www.issp.org for the ISSP. 
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Table 2. Autonomy as a feature of industries’ micro work environment 
Panel (a): Industries included in empirical analysis 
 
 
Industry (NACE classification rev. 1.1, two digits, with code in square brackets) 
Industry work 
autonomy 
benchmark 
Agriculture, hunting, related service activities [1] 5.88 
Forestry, logging, related service activities [2] 5.61 
Fishing, fish farming and related service activities [5] 6.03 
Manufacture of food products and beverages [15] 4.74 
Manufacture of tobacco products [16] 4.20 
Manufacture of textiles [17] 3.83 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur [18] 3.97 
Tanning and dressing of leather [19] 4.08 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials [20] 4.79 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products [21] 5.10 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media [22] 6.42 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel [23] 6.09 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products [24] 5.85 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products [25] 4.71 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products [26] 4.74 
Manufacture of basic metals [27] 4.78 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified [29] 5.29 
Manufacture of office machinery and computers [30] 6.27 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classified [31] 5.12 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
[32] 5.63 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
[33] 6.58 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers [34] 5.08 
Manufacture of other transport equipment [35] 5.83 
Other business activities [74] 6.66 
Mean of industry means for industries included in empirical analysis (n=24) 5.30 
Panel (b): Selected industries, not included in empirical analysis 
 
 
Industry (NACE classification rev. 1.1, two digits, with code in square brackets) 
Industry work 
autonomy 
benchmark 
Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of peat [10] 3.91 
Hotels and restaurants [55] 5.47 
Education [80] 6.73 
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation [67] 7.24 
Research and development, basic research [73] 7.53 
Notes. Data are own calculations based on data from Waves 1-4 of the ESS, which have been held bi-
annually in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. 
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Table 3. The reliability of measuring industry work autonomy 
Intercorrelations for 
different measures of 
occupational work 
autonomy 
Panel (a): 
 
No minimum number of 
observations per two-digit 
occupational category 
Panel (b): 
 
 
Minimum 20 observations per two-
digit occupational category [n=24] 
Panel (c): 
 
 
Minimum 100 observations per two-
digit occupational category [n=19] 
Mean occupation 
score on work 
autonomy, ISSP 
Mean occupation 
score on work 
autonomy, GSS 
Mean occupation 
score on work 
autonomy, ISSP 
Mean occupation 
score on work 
autonomy, GSS 
Mean occupation 
score on work 
autonomy, ISSP 
Mean occupation 
score on work 
autonomy, GSS 
Mean occupation score on 
work autonomy, ESS 
0.773 
[n=36] 
0.598 
[n=27] 0.875 0.634 0.921 0.811 
Mean occupation score on 
work autonomy, ISSP 1 
0.702 
[n=27] 1 0.741 1 0.849 
Notes: Number of industries/observations in square brackets, if applicable. Since data on respondents’ industry (e.g., NACE codes) are seldom 
collected in surveys, I have calculated worker autonomy scores for occupations instead. I used data on respondents’ occupation measured by ISCO 
(International Standard Classification of Occupations) codes. I thereby collapsed four-digit ISCO codes into two-digit codes as a way to make 
them comparable to the two-digit NACE codes used for Table 2. Data are own calculations based on data from the ESS (Waves 1-4), from the 
GSS (years 2002, 2006, and 2010), and from the 2005 ISSP Module on Work Orientation (ISSP Research Group, 2013). The ISSP data have been 
collected in the following 32 country regions: Australia, West-Germany, East-Germany, UK, US, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Russia, New Zealand, Canada, Philippines, Israel, Japan, Spain, Latvia, France, Cyprus, Portugal, Denmark, 
Switzerland, Flanders (Province of Belgium), Finland, Mexico, Taiwan, South Africa, South Korea, and Dominican Republic. 
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Table 4. Work autonomy, social trust, and revealed comparative advantage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Social trust interaction (aiTc) 1.32*** (0.205) 
1.12*** 
(0.227) 
0.984*** 
(0.240) 
0.984*** 
(0.240) 
High skill intensity interaction (siHc) - 0.453* (0.231) - 
0.205 
(0.361) 
Human capital work autonomy interaction (aiHc) - - 0.770** (0.311) 
0.566 
(0.494) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 696 696 696 696 
R2 0.276 0.279 0.280 0.281 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of revealed comparative advantage of country c in 
industry i (see Eq. 1). Sample covers 24 industries (two-digit NACE) in 29 countries. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are robust standard errors. Coefficients are standardized beta coefficients. ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05, and *p<0.10. 
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Table 5. Robustness check for alternative measures of industry work autonomy, an alternative measure of industry skill intensity, and different 
samples 
 
Alternative industry work 
autonomy measure, below-
average work autonomy sample 
Alternative industry work 
autonomy measure, above-
average work autonomy sample 
Alternative 
measure of 
high skill 
intensity (si) 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Social trust interaction with industry autonomy measure 
based on below-average work autonomy sample (aiTc) 
0.830*** 
(0.290) - - - - 
Social trust interaction with industry autonomy measure 
based on above-average work autonomy sample (aiTc) - - 
0.770** 
(0.305) - - 
Social trust interaction (aiTc) - 1.04*** (0.260) - 
0.738*** 
(0.225) 
0.984*** 
(0.240) 
High skill intensity interaction (siHc) 0.499 (0.315) 
0.031 
(0.386) 
0.585* 
(0.333) 
0.084 
(0.460) - 
General skill intensity interaction (siHc) - - - - 0.487 (0.507) 
Human capital autonomy interaction with industry 
autonomy measure based on below-average work 
autonomy sample (aiHc) 
0.230 
(0.448) - - - - 
Human capital autonomy interaction with industry 
autonomy measure based on above-average work 
autonomy sample (aiHc) 
- - 
0.901* 
(0.518) - - 
Human capital autonomy interaction (aiHc) - 0.875 (0.543) - 
1.21** 
(0.592) 
0.466 
(0.459) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 609 609 609 609 696 
No. of countries 29 29 29 29 29 
No. of industries 21 21 21 21 24 
R2 0.2563 0.2707 0.3347 0.3359 0.2816 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of revealed comparative advantage of country c in industry i. The industries that have been 
dropped differ for the two alternative measures of industry work autonomy (see Table B.2 in Appendix B). Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
robust standard errors. Coefficients are standardized beta coefficients. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.10. 
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Table 6. Controlling for institutional quality and industries’ dependence on external finance 
 
Quality of 
formal 
institutions (Qc) 
External finance dependence (fi) 
Quality of 
formal 
institutions & 
Dependence 
on external 
finance 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Social trust interaction (aiTc) 0.946*** (0.299) 
1.08*** 
(0.254) 
1.02*** 
(0.244) 
1.04*** 
(0.309) 
Institutional quality 
interaction (aiQc) 
0.053 
(0.373) - - 
0.065 
(0.392) 
Dependence on external 
finance interaction (fiTc) - 
0.158 
(0.142) - 
0.158 
(0.142) 
High skill intensity 
interaction (siHc) 
0.205 
(0.361) 
-0.263 
(0.483) 
-0.383 
(0.465) 
-0.263 
(0.484) 
Human capital work 
autonomy interaction (aiHc) 
0.560 
(0.510) 
1.22* 
(0.626) 
1.35** 
(0.603) 
1.21* 
(0.642) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 696 609 609 609 
No. of countries 29 29 29 29 
No. of industries 24 21 21 21 
R2 0.2808 0.3372 0.3356 0.3373 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of revealed comparative advantage of country c in 
industry i. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors. Coefficients are standardized beta 
coefficients. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.10. 
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Table 7. The causal effect of social trust on comparative advantage in high-/low-autonomy industries 
 (14) (15) 
Social trust interaction (aiTc) 0.758*** (0.268) 
0.607** 
(0.268) 
High skill intensity interaction (siHc) 0.205 (0.360) 
0.205 
(0.386) 
Human capital work autonomy interaction (aiHc) 0.738 (0.527) 
0.630 
(0.563) 
Institutional quality interaction (aiQc) - 0.335 (0.293) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 696 696 
R2 0.2774 0.2789 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of revealed comparative advantage of country c in 
industry i. Since the trust measure used for this table is itself generated using regression analysis, standard 
errors are robust standard errors that are bootstrapped using 1,000 repetitions. Coefficients are 
standardized beta coefficients. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.10. 
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Appendix A: Correlation between social trust and average work autonomy in countries 
 
 
Figure A.1 
Correlation between social trust and average work autonomy in a country. 
 
Notes: Sample concerns 30 Eurasian countries that have been included in Waves 1-5 of the European 
Social Survey (ESS). The measure of social trust is the standard measure constructed using data from the 
European Value Study (EVS) and World Values Survey (WVS). The specific items and procedure used 
are presented and discussed in detail later on in the paper. 
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Appendix B: Sample and descriptive statistics 
 
This appendix presents information on the main sample. Table B.1 below thereby concerns industry-level 
variables and contains data on two types of variables. The first type of variable is the dependent variable, 
for which I present summary statistics for each of the 24 industries in my sample. The second type of 
variables are independent variables in my analysis and concern the benchmarking of industries. The 
industry benchmarks are calculated using individual-level data from the ESS and firm-level data from the 
2012/2013 EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS V). 
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Table B.1 
Sample and descriptive statistics for revealed comparative advantage (RCA), alternative measures of industry work autonomy, different measures 
of industry skill intensity, and industries’ dependence on external finance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry (NACE code in square brackets) 
RCA 
 
Industry work 
autonomy 
(based on 
below-average 
work autonomy 
sample) 
 
Industry work 
autonomy 
(based on 
above-average 
work autonomy 
sample) 
 
 
High skill 
intensity 
(percentage 
high skilled 
workers) 
 
 
 
General skill 
intensity 
(average years 
of education) 
Dependence on 
external finance 
(% firms with 
credit line or 
loan from a 
financial 
institution) 
Agriculture, hunting, related service activities 
[1] 
114 
[29] 
(117) 
5.24 7.59 2.97% 8.77 - 
Forestry, logging, related service activities [2] 
186 
[29] 
(400) 
4.36 7.28 5.13% 10.6 100% 
Fishing, fish farming and related service 
activities [5] 
269 
[29] 
(509) 
5.26 - 3.37% 9.36 - 
Manufacture of food products and beverages 
[15] 
177 
[29] 
(240) 
4.02 5.80 5.70% 10.8 41.3% 
Manufacture of tobacco products [16] 
99 
[29] 
(131) 
- - 5.15% 9.44 44.8% 
Manufacture of textiles [17] 
131 
[29] 
(152) 
3.38 4.66 2.98% 9.16 45.7& 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and 
dyeing of fur [18] 
158 
[29] 
(196) 
3.68 4.68 2.47% 9.70 30.6% 
Tanning and dressing of leather [19] 
120 
[29] 
(154) 
3.91 4.93 3.69% 8.89 46.2% 
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Table B.1, continued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry (NACE code in square brackets) 
 
 
Industry work 
autonomy 
(based on 
below-average 
work autonomy 
sample) 
 
Industry work 
autonomy 
(based on 
above-average 
work autonomy 
sample) 
 
 
High skill 
intensity 
(percentage 
high skilled 
workers) 
 
 
 
General skill 
intensity 
(average years 
of education) 
Dependence on 
external finance 
(% firms with 
credit line or 
loan from a 
financial 
institution) 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood 
and cork, except furniture; manufacture of 
articles of straw and plaiting materials [20] 
156 
[29] 
(176) 
4.13 6.02 3.94% 10.4 42.9% 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper 
products [21] 
125 
[29] 
(168) 
4.15 5.78 3.28% 10.8 42.2% 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of 
recorded media [22] 
93 
[29] 
(74) 
5.76 6.76 13.2% 12.8 31.8% 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum 
products and nuclear fuel [23] 
114 
[29] 
(91) 
- - 12.0% 12.2 9.1% 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products [24] 
88 
[29] 
(70) 
4.88 6.67 14.7% 12.7 34.1% 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
[25] 
95 
[29] 
(41) 
3.64 5.66 5.91% 11.2 38.6% 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products [26] 
116 
[29] 
(86) 
3.91 5.96 5.75% 10.7 39.3% 
Manufacture of basic metals [27] 
131 
[29] 
(90) 
3.73 5.73 5.65% 10.9 50.6% 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment not 
elsewhere classified [29] 
82 
[29] 
(43) 
3.99 6.66 9.17% 12.0 31.5% 
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Table B.1, continued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry (NACE code in square brackets) 
 
 
Industry work 
autonomy 
(based on 
below-average 
work autonomy 
sample) 
 
Industry work 
autonomy 
(based on 
above-average 
work autonomy 
sample) 
 
 
High skill 
intensity 
(percentage 
high skilled 
workers) 
 
 
 
General skill 
intensity 
(average years 
of education) 
Dependence on 
external finance 
(% firms with 
credit line or 
loan from a 
financial 
institution) 
Manufacture of office machinery and 
computers [30] 
82 
[29] 
(100) 
- 6.68 20.9% 13.7 36.4% 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and 
apparatus not elsewhere classified [31] 
97 
[29] 
(57) 
4.18 6.16 8.98% 11.7 29.7% 
Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus [32] 
87 
[29] 
(75) 
4.17 6.44 11.9% 12.8 28.6% 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks [33] 
76 
[29] 
(71) 
5.08 7.15 14.0% 12.9 23.0% 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers [34] 
81 
[29] 
(56) 
4.06 5.93 8.30% 11.9 37.2% 
Manufacture of other transport equipment [35] 
69 
[29] 
(50) 
4.76 6.51 8.97% 11.9 45.7% 
Other business activities [74] 
63 
[29] 
(73) 
5.91 7.02 18.5% 13.6 - 
Whole sample 
117 
[696] 
(177) 
4.39 
[21] 
(0.711) 
6.19 
[21] 
(0.810) 
8.19% 
[24] 
(5.16%) 
11.2 
[24] 
1.48 
39.5% 
[21] 
16.8% 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses and number of observations in square brackets, if applicable. The construction of the two alternative 
measures of industry work autonomy, one based on individual-level data from countries that have mean levels of mean work autonomy below the 
sample average and one based on individual-level data from countries that have mean levels of mean work autonomy above the sample average, is 
described in the main text. Following the results of the reliability analysis (Section 3 and Table 3 in the main text), I only consider alternative 
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industry work autonomy scores based on responses from at least 100 individuals. This criterion results in missing industry work autonomy scores 
for three out of 24 industries in the analysis. As mentioned in the main text, I construct the two measures of industry skill intensity in the same way 
as the industry work autonomy measure, meaning that I aggregate individual-level data from Waves 1-4 of the ESS at the industry level. Although 
they have the same survey as their source, the data for these two measures is rather different. High skill intensity is measured as the percentage of 
people employed in an industry with an educational classification of at least some tertiary education (ISCED V1 or higher). The ISCED measure 
of a respondent’s education level is constructed by the ESS project team by recording the highest degree that a respondent has obtained, which is 
country-specific, and then harmonizing the recorded degree to fit the cross-country ISCED classification. General skill intensity, in contrast, does 
not involve post-processing and is simply measured using respondents’ answer to the survey item that asks them how many years of education 
they have. See Panel c of Table 1 for more information on the education data in the ESS. The measure of high skill intensity is the main measure 
that I use in my empirical analyses, using the general skill intensity measure in a robustness check. Following the procedure for industry work 
autonomy, I have checked that industry skill intensity scores are based on at least 100 individual-level observations. The calculation of the 
measure of industries’ dependence on external finance is as described in the main text. 
 
  
Supplementing the industry-level data presented in Table B.1, Table B.2 concerns data on country-level 
independent variables, for which I present summary statistics for each of the 29 countries in my sample. 
 
 
Table B.2 
Sample and descriptive statistics for country-level independent variables. 
Country 
Human capital endowment (years of 
schooling) Institutional quality (rule of law) 
Australia 11.9 1.71 
Austria 9.9 1.86 
Belgium 10.6 1.24 
Canada 12.3 1.66 
Czech Republic 13.1 0.82 
Denmark 11.1 1.95 
Finland 10.1 1.95 
France 9.9 1.40 
Germany 12.2 1.66 
Greece 9 1.55 
Hungary 9.8 0.78 
Iceland 11.5 0.83 
Ireland 9.9 1.97 
Italy 11.4 1.58 
Japan 9.5 0.47 
South Korea 11.2 1.24 
Mexico 7.8 -0.41 
Netherlands 11 1.75 
New Zealand 12.2 1.85 
Norway 12.7 1.91 
Poland 9.7 0.42 
Portugal 7.2 1.20 
Slovakia 11.6 0.52 
Spain 11.1 0.97 
Sweden 9.7 1.10 
Switzerland 11.7 1.78 
Turkey 10.8 1.90 
UK 6.1 0.16 
US 13.2 1.53 
 
 
  
Appendix C: Social trust indicators and their construction 
 
Table C.1 reports country scores on the two different trust indicators that I use in the empirical analysis. 
The main trust indicator (first column) is based on all available data from the combined EVS-WVS 
dataset. As discussed in the main text, the alternative trust indicator is constructed as a measure of the 
cultural component of social trust that is stable and independent of economic and institutional influences. 
I construct this indicator using data on first- and second-generation migrants from the ESS (Waves 1-5 / 
years 2002-2010). The ESS trust item is almost identical to the EVS-WVS trust item, asking respondents 
to answer the following question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or 
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?,’ with answers ranging from 0, ‘You can’t be too 
careful’ to 10, ‘Most people can be trusted.’ 
 
 
Table C.1 
Country trust scores for different social trust indicators. 
Country Social trust Cultural component of social trust (Trust of migrants) 
Australia 44.6% 0.033 
Austria 32.7% -0.019 
Belgium 31.3% -0.080 
Canada 44.5% 0.224 
Czech Republic 26.7% -0.021 
Denmark 58.8% 0.327 
Finland 56.5% 0.032 
France 21.9% -0.306 
Germany 34.3% -0.082 
Greece 23.7% -0.174 
Hungary 26.9% -0.102 
Iceland 41.3% 0.132 
Ireland 41.5% 0.050 
Italy 31.7% -0.260 
Japan 41.6% 0.240 
South Korea 31.7% -0.038 
Mexico 24.1% 0.197 
Netherlands 50.6% 0.063 
New Zealand 50.0% 0.104 
Norway 66.4% -0.097 
Poland 23.3% -0.329 
Portugal 17.4% -0.168 
Slovakia 21.3% -0.146 
Spain 32.8% -0.259 
Sweden 63.5% 0.102 
Switzerland 43.8% 0.338 
Turkey 11.3% -0.314 
UK 35.9% -0.007 
US 41.2% 0.023 
 
 
The approach to constructing the alternative trust indicator is to model individual trust as a function 
of a set of independent variables. The most important independent variables are the dummy variables that 
represent the country of ancestry of migrants, as I use the estimated coefficients for these dummies to 
measure the cultural component of trust (cf. Algan and Cahuc, 2010). Other independent variables are 
  
added as control variables. The main control variables are dummies for the destination country of 
migrants, which capture variation in trust scores due to living in a particular economic and institutional 
environment. I further control for age (10 cohort dummies), sex, marital status, employment status, 
income category, religious denomination (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Other Christian 
denomination, Jewish, Islamic, Eastern religions, Other non-Christian religions), and year fixed effects. 
When using categorical independent variables, I add a category for cases with missing data. 
A key feature of the measurement of the cultural component of social trust is the identification of 
first- and second-generation migrants and their ancestry countries. I identify first-generation migrants by 
respondents’ answers to the item asking ‘Were you born in [country]?’ For these individuals I 
subsequently identify their country of ancestry by the answer to the item asking ‘In which country were 
you born?’ In similar fashion, I identify second-generation migrants by respondents’ answers to three 
survey items. As with first-generation migrants, the first item asks ‘Were you born in [country]?’ The 
other two items ask ‘Was your father born in [country]?’ and ‘Was your father born in [country]?’ 
respectively. I classify a respondent as a migrant when their father, their mother, or both their parents 
were not born in the destination country, whilst the respondent was. I subsequently identify these 
migrants’ country of ancestry using the two items asking ‘In which country was your father born?’ and 
‘In which country was your mother born?’ In principle, a respondent’s father and mother can be born in 
different countries, in which case I select the country in which the respondent’s mother was born as the 
ancestry country.  
Using the above approach, I identify 15,208 migrants with ancestry in one of the 29 countries in my 
RCA sample. Table C.1 presents the scores of these countries on the measure of the cultural component 
of social trust, in turn obtained by estimating the regression model described above. Details of this 
regression model are available on request. 
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